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Now Zad, located in the district of Helmand province that bears the same name, was once the second largest 
city of the province with a population of more 
than 30,000. Although somewhat isolated in 
the northern part of Helmand, it had everything 
that an Afghan needed to flourish, including fer-
tile farmland and bustling bazaars. However, in 
early 2006 the Taliban took control and drove 
away the entire population of Now Zad. Many of 
the residents moved as far away as Lashkar Gah, 
an arduous 125-kilometer (48-mile) journey on 
rough roads through Taliban-infested areas, 
and wondered if they would ever return to their 
homes. After taking over Now Zad, the mili-
tants filled the homes, shops, schools and streets 
with mines and improvised explosive devices, 
much as they had done in many other areas.
The second major offensive in Helmand 
province for Task Force Leatherneck (the 2nd 
Marine Expeditionary Brigade), Operation Co-
bra’s Anger in December 2009, was to remove the 
Taliban from Now Zad. Once cleared, Now Zad 
was a prime candidate for immediate assistance 
and the type of international development crit-
ical to the United States’ counterinsurgency 
strategy of "Clear-Hold-Build." This strategy 
involves clearing a target area of insurgents 
(Clear), providing security and infrastructure 
to locals while screening the population for 
insurgents (Hold), and establishing or re-estab-
lishing essential services using both NGO and 
local workforces (Build). The only problem was 
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In Afghanistan, the United States and United Nations are developing a new approach 
to community-based demining by funding local nongovernmental organizations. The 
use of these Afghan NGOs has not only allowed clearance to begin more quickly and 
continue more effectively, but has also helped the local population along the path to 
recovery and supported overall counterinsurgency efforts.
that the explosive remnants of the battle for 
Now Zad and the large number of mines and 
IEDs left by the Taliban still littered the area.
The Strategy
The Office of Weapons Removal and Abate-
ment in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) man-
ages and executes the work required to create 
the “bridge” from hold to build within the U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy. Known as Con-
ventional Weapons Destruction, the effort ad-
dresses humanitarian mine action, battle-area 
clearance and small-arms and light-weapons 
destruction. CWD has enabled the United 
States to be the international leader in this im-
portant aspect of humanitarian assistance and 
development. Since 1993, the United States has 
provided more than US$1.8 billion to more 
than 80 countries to conduct demining and un-
exploded-ordnance clearance, and since 2001 
has destroyed more than 1.4 million weapons 
and 80,000 tons of otherwise at-risk, unstable 
or unsecure weapons and ammunition that 
could find their way into the militants’ hands.1 
In Afghanistan alone, the United States has 
funded projects totaling nearly $200 million. 
PM/WRA provides funds to U.S. contractors 
and international nongovernmental organi-
zations to conduct clearance and destruction 
operations, develop survivor and educational 
services, and establish capacity for the host na-
tion to eventually take ownership of the effort. 
Community-Based Demining 
A concept now being used by 
the United States and the United 
Nations in Afghanistan is one of 
community-based demining. Often, 
when contractors and internation-
al NGOs establish demining and 
clearance operations in an area, the 
workforce is recruited from the lo-
cal area, trained and employed to 
execute the project, and later dis-
patched to other areas needing clear-
ance. Thus, in a way, all demining 
and clearance operations can be 
called community-based. Howev-
er, CBD in Afghanistan is different 
in many ways because the approach 
uses Afghan NGOs that have worked 
in Afghanistan for 20 years or more. 
The Afghan NGOs have built a re-
lationship with the population and 
are able to recruit individuals who 
will remain after the project is com-
plete. The NGOs can also enter an 
area very soon after combat opera-
tions have ceased. Often, interna-
tional NGOs will not be welcomed 
or cannot gain access to those areas 
due to the security situation. This 
aspect is important since in the past, 
demining and clearance operations 
have only been attempted after con-
flicts have ended. In the conflict in 
Afghanistan, quick action is vital 
to rebuilding trust and confidence 
with the local residents. The United 
States currently funds five Afghan 
NGOs—Afghan Technical Consul-
tants, Demining Agency for Afghan-
istan, Mine Clearance Planning 
Agency, Mine Detection Center, 
and Organization for Mine Clear-
ance and Afghanistan Rehabilita-
tion—that are uniquely positioned 
to implement these community-based 
projects quickly and effectively.
CBD differs from other demining 
and clearance efforts; organizations 
work closely with the local leader-
ship in a specific village, district or 
province. The local leaders identify 
projects and assist in informing the 
residents of the impact of CBD and 
the need for a local workforce. This 
workforce, many times consisting of 
young men who would otherwise be 
recruited by the Taliban for insur-
gent operations, is then trained in 
the skill of demining. Often the men 
are put through vocational training 
during their off-duty hours to en-
sure they have a relevant trade once 
the project is complete. This in turn 
builds confidence and a sense of 
ownership in the overall project, as 
well as a sense of pride that the lo-
cal populations are involved in the 
improvement of their village or dis-
trict. Such examples of CBD rein-
force local governance and reduce 
the influence of insurgents. 
Successes of CBD in Now Zad
PM/WRA regularly makes an ef-
fort to coordinate closely with U.S. 
or Coalition Forces in an area, and 
Task Force Leatherneck was no ex-
ception. The U.S. Marines quickly 
understood the importance of dem-
ining and clearance operations and 
the benefits that CBD could provide. 
Soon after the completion of the 
operation, Brigadier General Law-
rence Nicholson, the Command-
er of Task Force Leatherneck, along 
with members of the U.S. Embassy 
in Kabul, Helmand Provincial Gov-
ernor Mangal and leaders from Now 
Zad, as well as representatives of the 
five Afghan demining NGOs fund-
ed by PM/WRA, conducted a dem-
ining shura. Shura, the Arabic word 
for consultation, is the way most Is-
lamic tribal leaders meet to resolve 
problems and issues. The purpose 
of this shura was to highlight the 
need to implement a CBD project 
in Now Zad, one that would address 
the most urgent clearance needs of 
recruiting and training a local workforce is vital to community-based demining. 
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the village and enable further de-
velopment projects to begin. Brig-
adier General Nicholson stressed 
that residents and local leadership 
needed to step up and take control 
of Now Zad or risk the town being 
returned to the Taliban. As a result 
of the shura, close coordination and 
planning commenced between the 
Marines, PM/WRA, U.S. Embassy, 
United Nations Mine Action Coor-
dination Center for Afghanistan, lo-
cal leadership and the NGOs. 
Vital to the NGOs and the lead-
ers of Now Zad were assurances of 
security from Task Force Leather-
neck—security that was not visi-
ble, but effective. What eventually 
materialized was a collaborative ef-
fort for a $1.8 million project with 
three of the five NGOs (Mine Clear-
ance Planning Agency, the Dem-
ining Agency for Afghanistan and 
the Mine Detection Center) where 
the strengths of each organization 
were leveraged. The project began in 
March 2010 and is scheduled to be 
completed within 12 months, em-
ploying more than 120 local staff, 
benefitting more than 1,350 fami-
lies and clearing 594,000 square ki-
lometers (229,345 square miles) of 
land covering the four most affect-
ed communities in and around Now 
Zad: Ali Zai, Barakzi, Deh Meyan 
and Sarkani. 
Over and above the initial ben-
efits, the project includes the es-
tablishment of a clinic, primarily 
for the medical care of the demin-
ers, but also to serve as a source of 
health support for the citizens of 
Now Zad. As the word spread that 
deminers were starting their work, 
many of the displaced members of 
Now Zad started to return, some for 
the first time in four years. 
CBD has been conducted in Af-
ghanistan for several years, with 
projects funded and executed in Ku-
nar, Nangahar and Kandahar prov-
inces. The projects’ workforce was 
recruited from the local area and 
included vocational training. Un-
like the projects that began sever-
al years after fighting had ceased in 
the Kunar, Nangahar and Kandahar 
provinces, however, the project in 
Now Zad commenced within weeks 
of combat concluding, giving devel-
opment agencies the opportunity to 
provide relief to the Now Zad area 
sooner than expected. The project 
in Now Zad is seen as a model for 
future uses of CBD, especially since 
it uses Afghan NGOs and beginning 
work early with local authorities 
means clearance operations can al-
low relief and development to arrive 
quickly. This further builds the pop-
ulation’s confidence in the NATO 
International Security Assistance 
Force’s work, and more important-
ly, in the local Afghan government.
Conclusion
Confidence is key to successful 
counterinsurgency operations. The 
local population must have confi-
dence in the forces in its area and in 
the agencies and organizations pro-
viding relief and development. The 
Marine Corps’ approach to coun-
terinsurgency stresses building this 
confidence through close coordi-
nation and partnering with local 
forces, government officials and the 
citizens of the areas for which they 
are responsible. In order to provide 
relief and development quickly, the 
time between hold and build must be 
as short as possible. Many times, due 
to combat operations recently con-
cluding, this time is delayed in order 
to clear the area of explosive rem-
nants of war. This delay could poten-
tially result in a loss of confidence by 
the local communities in the forces 
operating in their area. CBD is yet 
another way for the United States 
to insure that the “bridge” from 
hold to build is as short as possible. 
 see endnotes page 80
u.s. and local leadership must be in-
volved to ensure the “bridge” from hold 
to build is successful.
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Destruction of Cluster Munitions 
     in Moldova
by Colin King [ C King Associates, Ltd. ] 
For some countries affected by cluster munitions, the obligations to demilitarize that 
accompany ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions may appear daunting. 
In 2009, however, Norwegian People’s Aid undertook a pilot project in Moldova to 
find a cheaper, more efficient alternative-disposal method. They discovered that not 
only can destruction of cluster munitions be done more effectively, but also that by 
using locally administered programs, international organizations can promote capac-
ity building and increased employment while also bolstering national pride and com-
mitment to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
During the Oslo Process, it became clear that several nations were con-cerned about their obligations to de-
stroy cluster munition stockpiles under Article 
3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 
fact, it soon became apparent that this might be 
a significant obstacle to signing or ratification 
for some countries.
Industrial demilitarization plants exist in 
several developed nations; however, costs are 
high, and most are running at or near capacity. 
Even if the resources were available, it would 
be uneconomical for an industrial unit to gear 
up for the disposal of small quantities of clus-
ter munitions, especially if these were unusual 
types. A new process would involve a great deal 
of additional effort, including research on the 
ammunition, development of a new procedure, 
fabricating or adapting existing machinery, re-
training the workforce, development of ade-
quate quality control measures and so forth.
The need for another option led Norwegian 
People’s Aid to examine alternative-dispos-
al means on a national or regional basis. One 
possible benefit of using locally administered 
programs was program ownership. This own-
ership, or increased national involvement, 
brings with it tangible gains, such as capacity 
building and increased employment, as well as 
intangible gains, such as a strong demonstra-
tion of commitment to the CCM and a sense 
of national pride. Other potential advantages of 
utilizing locally administered programs includ-
ed lower cost and faster completion. During the 
2008–09 period, a preliminary study established 
that locally administered, alternative-disposal 
options were realistic.
Moldova Pilot Program
The concept of small-scale regional pro-
grams was presented at the 2009 Berlin 
Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Mu-
nitions;1 here, Moldova was among a small 
number of delegations that approached NPA 
to express an interest in a pilot project. 
An NPA assessment team visited Moldova 
in October 2009 and identified five types of 
Russian cluster-bomb and submunition pay-
loads in the Moldovan inventory. The sub-
munitions included three types of anti-armor 
bomblets (PTAB-2.5, PTAB-2.5M and PTAB-
10-5) and two types of fragmentation bomb-
lets (AO-1SCh and AO-2.5RT). Externally, the 
bombs were in reasonably good condition, 
suggesting that the submunitions would be 
well-preserved.
Unloading of cluster bombs. The NPA team 
conducted all work at a Bulboaca military 
2
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol14/iss3/3
